Postgraduate Course: Philosophy of Mind and Cognitive Science (Online) (PHIL11130)
Course Outline
| School | School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences |
College | College of Humanities and Social Science |
| Course type | Online Distance Learning |
Availability | Not available to visiting students |
| Credit level (Normal year taken) | SCQF Level 11 (Postgraduate) |
Credits | 20 |
| Home subject area | Philosophy |
Other subject area | None |
| Course website |
None |
Taught in Gaelic? | No |
| Course description | This course is aimed at offering an overview of a selection of core topics in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science, such as psychological explanation, the nature of conscious experience, the
place of mental states in the causal structure of the world, and the commitments of folk psychology. |
Entry Requirements (not applicable to Visiting Students)
| Pre-requisites |
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Co-requisites | |
| Prohibited Combinations | |
Other requirements | None |
| Additional Costs | None |
Course Delivery Information
| Not being delivered |
Summary of Intended Learning Outcomes
| Students will gain knowledge of some of the key issues in contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science. They will also develop their skills in critical thinking and in the oral and written presentation of philosophical arguments. |
Assessment Information
| Students will be assessed by a 2500 word essay at the end of the semester (85%) and successful participation in the on-line activities associated with the course (15%). |
Special Arrangements
| None |
Additional Information
| Academic description |
Not entered |
| Syllabus |
Provisional syllabus for 14/15:
Week 1: Introduction and functionalism - Synchronous seminar
Week 2: Non-reductive materialism - Synchronous seminar
Week 3: Eliminative materialism - Asynchronous forum seminar
Week 4: Mechanistic explanation - Synchronous seminar
Week 5: The language of thought hypothesis - Asynchronous forum seminar
Week 6: Tacit theories - Synchronous seminar
Week 7: The extended mind - Asynchronous forum seminar
Week 8: The modular mind - Synchronous seminar
Week 9: The embodied mind - Asynchronous forum seminar
Week 10: Against the computational mind Synchronous seminar
Week 11: Review Asynchronous forum seminar
This may be subject to change; the final syllabus will be posted on Learn when the course commences in September.
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| Transferable skills |
Not entered |
| Reading list |
WEEK 1:
Class Readings
D.C. Dennett ¿Personal and sub-personal levels of explanation.¿ reprinted in J. Bermudez (Ed) Philosophy of Psychology: contemporary readings (Routledge 2006). Available as an Ebook.
Secondary readings
J.L. Bermudez Philosophy of Psychology: a contemporary introduction, ch.2 (Routledge, 2005)
D. Davidson ¿Psychology as Philosophy¿ In Bermudez (Ed)
M. Tsarkiris & P. Haggard (2011). Neural, functional and phenomenological signatures of intentional action. In F. Grammont, D. Legrand, and P. Livet (Eds.) Naturalizing Intention in Action. MIT. Press.
R. Van Gulick (2009). Functionalism. In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (128 - 151) Oxford University Press
WEEK 2:
Class reading
L. Anthony (2007) Everybody has got it: a defence of non-reductive materialism. In B. McLaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (160 ¿ 181) Blackwells.
Secondary readings
L. Rudder-Baker (2009). Non-Reductive materialism. In B. McLaughlin, A. Beckermann & S. Walter (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind (109 ¿ 127) Oxford University Press.
T. Crane (2001). Elements of Mind. (sections 9-17) Oxford University Press.
J. Fodor (1990). Making mind matter more. In his A Theory of Content and Other Essays. (137 ¿ 160) Bradford Books.
S. Stich (1983). Will the Concepts of Folk Psychology Find a Place in Cognitive Science? in his book From Folk Psychology to Cognitive Science: The Case Against Belief, (210-19) MIT Press.
WEEK 3:
Class readings
Paul Churchland, (1981) Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78, 67 ¿ 90
Secondary readings
P. Churchland (2007) The Evolving Fortunes of Eliminative Materialism. In B. Mclaughlin & J. Cohen (Eds.) Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Mind. (160 ¿ 181) Blackwells. Highly recommended as a supplementary reading for this week.
P. Churchland (1979) Scientific Realism and the Plasticity of Mind. Cambridge University Press. Ch.4.
T. Horgan and J. Woodward (1985) Folk Psychology is here to stay. Philosophical Review, 94, 197 ¿ 226
D. Lewis (1972) Psychophysical and theoretical identifications. Australisian Journal of Philosophy, 50, 249 ¿ 258 (pp.248 ¿ 253 are the most relevant).
WEEK 4:
P. Machamer, L. Darden & C. Craver ¿Thinking about mechanisms.¿ Philosophy of Science, 67 (2000), 1-25.
Secondary readings
R. Cummins ¿¿How does it work?¿ versus ¿What are the laws?¿: Two conceptions of psychological explanation.¿ Reprinted in Bermudez (Ed.) Philosophy of Psychology: Contemporary Readings. Routledge, 2006.
R. Cummins, ¿Functional Analysis¿ Journal of Philosophy 1975
J. Bermudez Philosophy of Psychology: a contemporary introduction, ch.3 (Routledge, 2005)
D. Lewis ¿Reduction of Mind.¿ reprinted in Bermudez & Macpherson (Ed¿s)
C. Wright & W. Bechtel ¿Mechanisms and psychological explanation¿ In P. Thagard (Ed) Philosophy of Psychology and Cognitive Science.
WEEK 5:
Class Readings
Fodor, J. (1987). Mental Representation: an introduction. In N. Rescher, Scientific Enquiry in Philosophical Perspective (pp. 105 - 128). University Press of America.
Fodor, J. (1987). Psychosemantics. (Appendix). MIT Press
Secondary readings
Ayede, M. (2004). The language of thought hypothesis, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Online.
Clark, A. (2001). Mindware: an introduction to Philosophy of Cognitive Science . Oxford University Press. ch.1 & 2
Crane, T. (1995/2003). The Mechanical Mind (2nd Edition ed.). Routledge. pp. 8 - 20
Cummins, R. (1989). Meaning and Mental Representation. M.I.T. Press. pp. 1 ¿ 26
Dennet, D. (1977). A cure for the common code. Reprinted in Brainstorms, ch.6. (1978) MIT Press.
WEEK 6:
Class Readings
Fodor, J. (1968) The appeal to tacit knowledge in psychological explanation. The Journal of Philosophy, 65 627 ¿ 640.
Stich, S. (1978). Beliefs and subdoxastic states. Philosophy of Science, 45, 499 - 518
Secondary readings
Cummins, R. (1978) Programs in the explanation of behaviour. Philosophy of Science, 44. 269 ¿ 287.
Davies, M. & Stone, T. (2001) Mental Simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of collapse. Philosophical topics 127¿173. [Section 4 is most salient; obviously if you¿d like to write on this topic, you should read the whole thing at some point].
Manfredi, P. (1993). Tacit beliefs and other doxastic attitudes. Philosophia, pp. 95-117.
Nisbett, R. & Wilson, T. (1977) ¿Telling More Than We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes¿. Psychological Review, 84.3, pp. 231-59.
Quine, W.V.O. (1972). Methodological reflections on current linguistic theory. In D. Davidson and G. Harman (Eds). Semantics of Natural Language. 442 ¿ 454.
Searle, J. (1992). The Unconscious and Its Relation to Consciousness. From his The Rediscovery of the Mind, pp. 151-73 (MIT Press).
Stich, S. & Ravenscroft, I. (1999). What is folk psychology? Cognition, 50, 447 ¿ 468.
WEEK 7:
Class readings
A. Clark & D. Chalmers (1998) The Extended Mind. Analysis 58 . 10-23:
Mark Sprevak (2009) ¿Extended Cognition and Functionalism.¿ Journal of Philosophy 106. 503-27
Secondary reading
Adams, F. And Aizawa, K. (2008). The Bounds of Cognition. Blackwell.
Adams, F. And Aizawa, K. (2010). Defending the bounds of cognition. Available here: https://mywebspace.wisc.edu/lshapiro/web/Phil554_files/A%26ADefending.pdf.
Clark, A. (2011). Supersizing the Mind. O.U.P.
Rowlands, M. (2009). Extended Cognition and the mark of the cognitive. Philosophical Psychology, 22, pp. 1 - 19
Rupert, R. (2004). Challenges to the hypothesis of the extended mind. Journal of Philosophy, 101, pp.389 ¿ 428.
Shapiro, L. (2011). Embodied Cognition. Ch. 3 & 6. Routledge
WEEK 8:
Class Reading
Carruthers, P. (2004). The mind is a system of modules shaped by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 293 ¿ 311). Blackwell.
Cowie, F., & Woodward, J. (2004). The mind is not (just) a system of modules shaped (just) by natural selection. In C. Hitchcock (Ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science (pp. 312 - 334). Blackwell.
Secondary Reading
Buller, D. & Hardcastle, V. ¿Evolutionary psychology, Meet Developmental Neurobiology: Against Promiscuous Modularity¿ Brain and Mind 1: 307-25
Carruthers, P. (2006). Simple heuristics meet massive modularity. In P. Carruthers, S. Laurence and S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind: Culture and Cognition.
Fodor, J. (1983). Precis of ¿The Modularity of Mind¿. Brain and Behavioural Sciences 8, 1 - 5
Samuels, R. (1998). Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science , 49, 575-602.
Sterelny, K. (2003). Thought in a Hostile World. (ch.10) Blackwell.
WEEK 9:
Class reading
Shapiro, L. (2011) Embodied Cognition. (Chapters 2 & 3) Routledge.
Secondary reading
Anderson, M. (2003) ¿Embodied cognition: a field guide¿ In Artificial Intelligence, 149, 91-130.
Barsalou, L.W. (2008) Grounded Cognition. Annu. Rev. Psychol. 59, 617-45
Boroditsky, L & Prinz, J. (2007) What thoughts are made of.
Haugeland, J. (1998) Mind Embodied and Embedded. In Having Thought: Essays in the Metaphysics of Mind. (207 ¿ 240) Harvard University Press.
Pfeifer, R. & Scheier, C. (1999) Understanding intelligence (parts II and III) MIT Press.
Wilson, M. (2002) ¿Six views of embodied cognition¿ In Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 9.4: 625-36
WEEK 10
Van Gelder, T. (1995) What might cognition be if not computation? Journal of Philosophy 92, 345-81
Grush, R. (2003) In Defence of Some Cartesian Assumptions Concerning the Brain and its Operations Biology and Philosophy 18, 53 ¿ 93
Secondary reading
Brooks, R. (1991) Intelligence without representation. Artificial Intelligence, 47, 139 ¿ 159
Calvo Garzón, F. (2008) Towards a general theory of antirepresentationalism. British Journal of Philosophy of Science, 59, 259 ¿ 292
Chomsky, N. (1959) Review of ¿Verbal Behaviour.¿ Language, 35, 26 ¿ 58.
Clark, A. & Toribio, J. (1994) Doing without representing? Synthese, 101, 401-431
Gallagher, S. (2008) ¿Are Minimal Representations Still Representations. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 351-69
Wheeler, M. (2008) Minimal Representing: A response to Gallagher. International Journal of Philosophical Studies, 16, 371-76
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| Study Abroad |
Not entered |
| Study Pattern |
Not entered |
| Keywords | Not entered |
Contacts
| Course organiser | Dr Suilin Lavelle
Tel: (0131 6)50 3665
Email: J.S.Lavelle@ed.ac.uk |
Course secretary | Miss Lynsey Buchanan
Tel: (0131 6)51 5002
Email: Lynsey.Buchanan@ed.ac.uk |
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