Economics of Strategic Behaviour 1 (VS1) (U02328)

? Credit Points : 20 ? SCQF Level : 10 ? Acronym : MSE-4-ESB1-VS1

This half-course Senior Honours option comprises the first term of the full-course option the Economics of Strategic Behaviour. The half-course reviews the game theoretic analysis of interactive decision-making, covering static and dynamic games with complete information, and static games with incomplete information. The basic concepts developed include: Nash equilibrium; dominant strategies; mixed strategies; games in extensive form; subgame perfection; timing & commitment; and Bayesian approaches to games of asymmetric information. The concepts are illustrated by applications, such as: Cournot oligopoly; the "tragedy of the commons"; tennis; bargaining; policy credibility; and auctions.

Entry Requirements

? This course is only available to part year visiting students.

? This course is a variant of the following course : U00269

? Pre-requisites : Topics in Economics Analysis 1

? Prohibited combinations : Economics of Strategic Behaviour (EC0031)

Subject Areas

Home subject area

Economics, (Management School and Economics, Schedule H)

Delivery Information

? Normal year taken : 4th year

? Delivery Period : Semester 1 (Blocks 1-2)

? Contact Teaching Time : 2 hour(s) per week for 10 weeks

First Class Information

Date	Start	End	Room	Area	Additional Information
18/09/2007	09:00	10:50	Room G.09, William Robertson Building	Central

All of the following classes

Type	Day	Start	End	Area
Lecture	Tuesday	09:00	10:50	Central

Summary of Intended Learning Outcomes

The main principles of static and dynamic game theory in complete information settings, and static games of incomplete information; The importance of information in strategic situations; The importance of timing, commitment and credibility; How game theory can help analyse and design auctions.