Undergraduate Course: Economics of Strategic Behaviour (ECNM10013)
Course Outline
| School | School of Economics |
College | College of Humanities and Social Science |
| Credit level (Normal year taken) | SCQF Level 10 (Year 4 Undergraduate) |
Availability | Available to all students |
| SCQF Credits | 40 |
ECTS Credits | 20 |
| Summary | This course is about economic decisions that involve conflict and interdependency in an essential way. Situations in which what one person, or firm, or government does affects the opportunities, profits, and welfare of others, and vice versa, are ubiquitous in the real world e.g., bidding for a house, negotiating a wage rise, introducing a new product, setting macroeconomic targets. New insights have been gained into these problems by the application of game theory. This can be defined as the study of models of conflict, and cooperation, between rational decision-makers who know what they want and do their best to get it. |
| Course description |
Not entered
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Information for Visiting Students
| Pre-requisites | None |
Course Delivery Information
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| Academic year 2014/15, Available to all students (SV1)
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Quota: None |
| Course Start |
Full Year |
Timetable |
Timetable |
| Learning and Teaching activities (Further Info) |
Total Hours:
400
(
Lecture Hours 44,
Summative Assessment Hours 3,
Programme Level Learning and Teaching Hours 8,
Directed Learning and Independent Learning Hours
345 )
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| Assessment (Further Info) |
Written Exam
70 %,
Coursework
30 %,
Practical Exam
0 %
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| Additional Information (Assessment) |
A 3 hour degree exam in May/June (70%) and two take home problem sets (one per semester) each contributing 15% to the final grade. |
| Feedback |
Not entered |
| Exam Information |
| Exam Diet |
Paper Name |
Hours & Minutes |
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| Main Exam Diet S2 (April/May) | | 3:00 | |
Learning Outcomes
| Having taken the course students will be able to understand: the main solution concepts in modern game theory; the importance of information in strategic situations; the importance of timing, commitment and credibility; why cooperation and collusion might (or might not) occur in situations involving conflict and interdependency; the role of dynamic games of complete and incomplete information; problems with game theory; evolutionary game theory.
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Additional Information
| Graduate Attributes and Skills |
Not entered |
| Keywords | Not entered |
Contacts
| Course organiser | Dr Ed Hopkins
Tel: (0131 6)50 3061
Email: Ed.Hopkins@ed.ac.uk |
Course secretary | Ms Dawn Hutcheon
Tel: (0131 6)51 5958
Email: Dawn.Hutcheon@ed.ac.uk |
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